This article empirically examines the relationship between the funding of defined benefit pension plans and corporate debt ratings. The evidence indicates that unfunded pension liabilities reduce debt ratings more than an equivalent amount of excess pension assets increase debt ratings. This asymmetric relationship is consistent with the view that unfunded pension liabilities are corporate liabilities that compete with debt claims, but that there are costs associated with quickly accessing excess pension assets due to the mandated sharing of reverted excess assets.
INTRODUCTION
Both the academic and practitioner literature indicate that bond ratings are an important source of information to investors and are of concern to corporate managers (Ederington 1992) . Not surprisingly, a number of research papers have attempted to identify the underlying firm characteristics which influence debt ratings (e.g., Iskandar and Emery 1994) . This paper extends this literature by examining the relationship between corporate debt ratings and pension funding. While pension funds are autonomous from a legal standpoint, the financial management literature generally views a firm's pension plans from an integrated balance sheet perspective; i.e., excess pension assets and unfunded pension liabilities are respectively corporate assets and corporate liabilities. Maher (1987) find that debt ratings are positively related to the aggregate funding status of a firm's pension plans. However, legislative changes occurred in the latter half of the 1980s, the apparent intention of which was to alter who paid unfunded pension liabilities and who received excess pension assets. In particular, security holders' claims to excess pension assets were eroded and the conditions under which firms could make the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) pay unfunded liabilities were restricted. Coincidentally, the reporting by corporations of the funding status of their pension plans expanded with the adoption of SFAS 87, "Employers Accounting for Pensions." This paper examines the relationship between debt ratings and pension funding in the period following the changes mentioned above using the more extensive disclosures now available. The main purpose is to examine whether excess pension assets and unfunded pension liabilities influence corporate debt ratings symmetrically. The paper's main focus can be highlighted by considering two hypothetical firms that are identical in all respects, except for the funding of their pension plans. Both firms have two defined benefit plans: one firm has funded both plans so that there are no excess pension assets and no unfunded liabilities, the other firm has one plan with excess assets and another plan with an equal amount of unfunded liabilities. The question is, will the debt ratings of these two firms be the same?
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we motivate the hypotheses. The data and methodology are described in section 3 and the results are presented in section 4. In the concluding section, we highlight some issues, which this paper leaves unresolved and which future research could address.
MOTIVATION 2
The probability of default on a debt claim depends on, among other factors, the economic value of the firm's liabilities relative to its assets (financial leverage), including "off-balance sheet" pension assets and pension liabilities. While controversy exists regarding the appropriate way to measure pension liabilities (see Ippolito 1985a; Pesando 1984; and Bulow 1982) , we adopt the convention that a plan is overfunded (underfunded) if pension assets are greater (less) than the accumulated benefit obligation (ABO).
This approach is consistent with accounting disclosures that separately report the funding of over and underfunded plans based on ABO.
The argument for why unfunded pension liabilities are likely to decrease debt ratings is straightforward. Under existing law, ongoing firms cannot shift unfunded pension liabilities to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) by terminating the plan.
3 Thus, if an on-going firm terminates an underfunded plan, it must use some of its assets to pay the underfunded amount, which decreases the assets available to pay other debt claims and thus increases the likelihood of default on those claims. Even if an underfunded plan termination is not anticipated, the underfunded plan represents a claim against future cash flows which decreases the security of other debtholders' claims, all else equal.
Conversely, excess pension assets are likely to increase debt ratings, ceteris paribus. Relative to an otherwise identical firm, a firm with overfunded plans needs less of its future cash flows to pay implicit pension promises. Consequently, the likelihood of default on other debtholders' claims is lower the more overfunded the firm's pension plans. However, should the contingency arise where the firm would like to access the excess pension assets all at once through a reversion, existing law requires that the firm share the excess pension assets with employees and the IRS. 4 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 levied a ten percent excise tax on reverted pension assets, and in 1988, the rate was increased to fifteen percent. In 1990, Congress increased the excise tax to twenty percent of reverted assets, provided that twenty-five percent of the pension surplus is used as a cushion for a replacement plan, or that benefits are increased by twenty-five percent; otherwise, the excise tax is fifty percent.
The mandated sharing of reverted excess pension assets, along with the inability of firms to walk away from unfunded liabilities, motivate the asymmetry hypothesis: ceteris paribus, unfunded pension liabilities decrease debt ratings more than an equal amount of excess pension assets increase debt ratings.
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The alternative, i.e., the symmetry hypothesis, is based on the premise that firms can avoid the sharing of excess pension assets using one or more of the following methods. First, firms can avoid pension reversions and instead obtain excess assets by reducing future pension contributions. Second, mandated sharing of reverted pension assets with employees can be offset through other adjustments in employee compensation. Third, mergers of underfunded and overfunded plans can allow a firm to use its excess pension assets to offset its unfunded liabilities in another plan without sharing the excess assets in the overfunded plan with the participants of that 3 Flowe (1992) describes how the Single Employer Pension Protection Act of 1986 (SEPPA) and the Pension Protection Act of 1987 (PPA) restrict a firm from walking away from its unfunded pension liabilities. 4 While firms' attempts to claim excess pension assets through reversions have often met with opposition from employees who contend that they own excess assets, the courts generally have found that the property right belongs to the firm. See Regier (1990, 1993) , Alderson and VanDerhei (1992) , Hsieh, Ferris and Chen (1990), and VanDerhei (1987) for analyses of the shareholder wealth effects of reversions and see Peterson (1992) , Middlestaedt (1989) , Thomas (1989) , and Stone (1987) for analyses of why firms undertake reversions. 5 The asymmetry could go the other way if a plan is terminated in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy courts could require that the PBGC pay some unfunded liabilities and exempt excess pension assets from excise taxes. On the other hand, the greater the likelihood of financial distress, the greater is the likelihood that the firm would find it optimal to access excess pension assets because of the costs of raising capital externally. Earlier versions of this article attempted to examine whether the asymmetry was conditional on the likelihood of financial distress. In particular, we interacted the pension variables with a predicted Altman et al. (1977) ZETA-score which measures the probability of financial distress. However, the coefficient estimates on the interaction variables were unstable across years.
plan or with the IRS. 6 If firms can access excess pension assets at low costs, then excess pension assets will be available to satisfy debtholders' claims. Consequently, unfunded pension liabilities and excess pension assets will influence debt ratings symmetrically.
METHODOLOGY

Model
Standard and Poor's (S&P) states that debt ratings are based on three criteria: (1) "Likelihood of default," (2) "Nature of and provisions of the obligation" and (3) "Protection afforded by, and relative position of, the obligation in the event of bankruptcy, reorganization ..." Consistent with these criteria, we model S&P's debt ratings as follows. We assume S&P calculates an index that measures expected default losses (the expected loss relative to the promised payment). Higher expected default losses correspond to lower values for the index. The range for the index (the real line) is divided into intervals, such that if the underlying index falls in the lowest interval, then the issue receives the lowest debt rating. If the index falls in the second interval, the issue receives the second lowest rating, etc. We do not observe the underlying index, but we do observe the resulting debt rating.
These assumptions can be formalized as follows. Let p i equal S&P's estimated probability of default and L i equal their estimate of the loss relative to the promised payment conditional on default on debt issue i. Then the unobservable index for the issue is: r i = f(p i L i ), f 6LQFH 6 3 KDV WZHQW\ GHEW UDWLQJ categories, the real line is divided into twenty intervals, where µ j-1 and µ j equal the endpoints for interval j (j=1,...,20). If r i falls in interval j (µ j -1 < r i ≤ µ j ), then the issue is assigned the jth lowest debt rating. , 6 In recent years, several firms have merged plans at the time of an acquisition. For example, following Keystone Consolidated Industries' acquisition of DeSoto Inc. in 1996, $54 million of DeSoto's excess pension assets were used to reduce Keystone's unfunded liabilities (Burr 1996) . 7 The model is estimated using ordered probit which assumes that µ0 equals minus infinity and µ20 equals positive infinity. Since the endpoints are not in general equally spaced, the ordered probit model does not impose linearity in the relationship between the latent variable, r, and debt ratings.
where X is a vector of firm characteristics that previous literature has found to influence debt ratings and β is a coefficient vector measuring the sensitivity of r to X. The first pension variable measures the amount of excess assets in firm i's overfunded plans and the second pension variable measures the amount of underfunding in the firm's underfunded plans. If a firm does not have underfunded (overfunded) plans, the underfunded (overfunded) variable takes a zero value. If unfunded pension liabilities and excess pension assets influence the underlying index symmetrically, then the coefficients on the two pension variables (γ U and γ O ) would be equal in magnitude. On the other hand, the asymmetry hypothesis implies that γ U > γ O in absolute value.
Estimation
The model is estimated using ordered probit (McKelvey and Zavonia 1975; and Becker and Kennedy 1992) . Maximum likelihood estimation yields coefficient estimates for the explanatory variables (the ß's and γ's) and estimates of the endpoints for the intervals partitioning the real line (the µ j 's). 8 The interpretation of the estimated model can be described with the aid of Figure 1 , where the estimated µ j 's partition the real line into twenty intervals. The dot product of the vector of coefficient estimates and firm A's vector of values for the right hand side variables identifies the location (mean) of a normal density function on the real line for firm A.
This density determines the probability that firm A will have a certain debt rating. Similarly, the dot product of the vector of coefficient estimates and firm B's vector of values for the right hand side variables identifies the location of firm B's density function. As depicted in Figure 1 , firm B's density is shifted to the right of firm A's density. The area under firm A's density function between the estimated values of µ 7 and µ 8 gives the probability that firm A will have the eighth highest debt rating. Similarly, the area under firm B's density function between µ 7 and µ 8 gives the probability that firm B will have the eighth highest debt rating. We define the predicted debt rating for a particular issue as the debt rating corresponding to the interval that contains the mean of the distribution. From Figure 1 , firm A has a predicted debt rating equal to the eighth highest debt rating and firm B's predicted debt rating is the eleventh highest. Note that this interpretation implies that the probability of obtaining a debt rating higher than the predicted debt rating is just below fifty percent (the area under the density function to the right of the right-hand endpoint of the interval containing the mean). Figure 1 Interpretation of Ordered Probit Model µ 4 µ 5 µ 6 µ 7 µ 8 µ 9 µ 10 µ 11 µ 12 µ 13 µ 4 µ 5 µ 6 µ 7 µ 4 µ 5 µ 6 µ 7 µ 8 µ 9 µ 10 µ 11 µ 12 µ 13 µ 8 µ 9 µ 10 µ 11 µ 12 µ 13 µ 4 µ 5 µ 6 µ 7 µ 8 µ 9 µ 10 µ 11 µ 12 µ 13 A B We analyze the data for each year separately, acknowledging the likely correlation in the errors for a given firm across time.
The control variables, which are taken from Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) and used in other debt rating studies (e.g., Iskandar and Emery 1994), include:
(1) SUB = 1 if the debt rating is for a subordinated instrument and 0 otherwise (after 1991 all ratings are for unsubordinated issues); (2) ASSETS = total assets less excess pension assets reported on the balance sheet; (3) INCOME = net income divided by ASSETS; (4) BETA = equity beta reported by Value Line; (5) LEV = long term debt less pension liabilities reported on the balance sheet divided by ASSETS.
The predicted signs for the coefficients on ASSETS and INCOME are positive and the predicted signs for the coefficients on LEV, BETA, and SUB are negative.
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The focus of the analysis is the estimated coefficients on the variables measuring excess pension assets and unfunded pension liabilities. Pension funding data are obtained from SFAS No. 87 disclosures as reported by Compustat. SFAS No. 87 requires that the footnotes of an annual report present information on a firm's underfunded plans separately from its overfunded plans. The separate disclosures for overfunded and underfunded plans are important when testing the asymmetry hypothesis. Prior to SFAS No. 87, firms only reported data on the aggregate funding status of all of their plans. The old disclosures could be used to examine the asymmetry hypothesis by testing whether aggregate pension funding influenced debt ratings for firms that are overfunded in aggregate differently than for firms that are underfunded in aggregate. This approach (in light of current data) suffers from two problems. First, if an asymmetry does exist, the aggregate funding measure introduces a specification error for firms with both overfunded and underfunded plans. By construction, the aggregate funding measure assumes excess pension assets offset unfunded pension liabilities dollar-for-dollar within a particular firm. The second problem is that most firms' pension plans are overfunded when aggregated, implying that relatively few observations can be used to estimate the influence of underfunding. For example, in our sample, less than sixteen percent of the firms are underfunded in aggregate, but about fifty percent have underfunded plans. The problems in using the aggregate net funding position are alleviated by the separate disclosures for overfunded plans and underfunded plans.
We adjusted the ABO figures to control for cross-sectional differences in the interest rate assumption used to calculate pension liabilities. 10, 11 For the plans that are reported to be underfunded (overfunded), if adjusted ABO is less (greater) than pension assets, then the firm's underfunded plans (overfunded plans) are reclassified as overfunded plans (underfunded plans) and aggregated together with the firm's other overfunded plans (underfunded plans). Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the funding of overfunded plans (Panel A) and the funding of underfunded plans (Panel B). In each year, over eighty-six percent of the firms have at least one overfunded plan. Both mean and median values suggest that the funding of overfunded plans is lower in the latter part of the sample period. This decrease could reflect many factors, including poorer corporate performance − the effects of legislation passed in 1987 that eliminated the tax deductibility of pension contributions when pension assets are more than 150 percent of ABO (see Ippolito 1990) , or the sharing rules imposed on reversions. Panel B indicates that about fifty percent of the firms have underfunded plans. A few firms have extremely poorly funded plans in 1987 and 1988, which 10 The following equation, which assumes a duration of pension liabilities equal to nine, was used to adjust the data: Adjusted ABO = (reported ABO) exp(-9 (reported interest rate -average rate)), where the average rate is the average rate used by all sample firms during the year. 11 When calculating pension liabilities, SFAS NO. 87 requires the use of a market interest rate at which the liability could be settled. This standardization improves the comparability of reported pension liabilities across firms relative to previous accounting standards. Nevertheless, cross-sectional variation exists in the reported rate. One view is that the reported liability figures are unbiased and that the variation reflects differences in other actuarial assumptions, plan characteristics, or plan participants. An alternative view is that the variation in the interest rate assumption reflects desires of firms to alter their reported liability figures. We estimated the models with the unadjusted data and found similar results.
causes the cross-sectional variation to be high in these years. The median values of underfunding, however, are relatively stable over the sample period. Table 1 suggests the presence of extreme values for underfunding in the early part of the sample period. To check for the influence of extreme values in general, we excluded the observations in the highest and lowest percentile for the entire sample period and then reestimated the models for each year. The coefficient estimates are consistent with those reported in Table 2 . However, p-values for the chi-square tests of equality of pension coefficients increased. In only two years was the p-value below ten percent. Pension funding measured by pension assets (PA) minus the adjusted accumulated benefit obligation (ABO) divided by total firm assets (ASSETS) for 1987 through 1994; the ABO figure is adjusted for differences in assumed interest rates as follows: adjusted ABO = (reported ABO) exp{-9(reported rate -average reported rate)}. Ordered probit results with separate funding measures for a firm's overfunded plans (subscript "OVER") and its underfunded plans (subscript "UND"), industry dummy variables are not included in equations, dependent variable is Standard and Poor's debt rating, which is ordinally ranked in twenty categories; ASSETS = the book value of assets, LEVERAGE = the book value of long term debt divided by ASSETS, BETA = equity beta reported by Value Line, INCOME = total income divided by ASSETS, SUB = one if the debt is subordinated, and zero otherwise; PA = pension assets, ABO = accumulated benefit obligation adjusted for differences in assumed interest rates [adjusted ABO = (reported ABO) exp{-9(reported rate -average reported rate)}. Coefficient estimate is reported with pvalue in parentheses below.
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Results Table 2 presents the ordered probit results. All of the coefficients on the control variables have their predicted signs and generally are statistically significant. The coefficient estimates on both pension funding variables also have their predicted signs in each of the eight years. The coefficient on the underfunded variable is statistically significant in each year and the coefficient on the overfunded variable is statistically significant in three years. While these results suggest that both excess assets and unfunded pension liabilities influence debt ratings, the coefficient estimates on the two pension variables indicate that the extent to which excess assets and unfunded liabilities influence debt ratings is not symmetric. The absolute value of the coefficient estimate on the underfunding variable exceeds the coefficient estimate on the overfunding variable in all eight years. Moreover, a chisquare test rejects at the ten percent level that the coefficient on the overfunding variable is equal to the coefficient on the underfunding variable in six of the eight years. The smaller coefficients on the overfunded pension variable support the asymmetry hypothesis.
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While these results provide statistical evidence that excess pension assets and unfunded pension liabilities are asymmetrically associated with debt ratings, the economic interpretation of the coefficient estimates in the ordered probit model is not transparent. 15 To assess the magnitude of the estimated asymmetry, we consider a hypothetical firm with median values for all the non-pension variables in the model and with excess pension assets of 2.0 percent of corporate assets and unfunded liabilities equal to 2.0 percent of corporate assets. We then ask, based on the estimated ordered probit models, what happens to the distribution of potential debt ratings if this hypothetical firm uses its excess assets to eliminate its unfunded liabilities?
13 Given that pension funding is endogenous (see Francis and Reiter 1987) , a concern is the possibility of omitted variables that are correlated with pension funding. To help control for industry factors that may be associated with both funding and debt ratings, we estimated the model with dummy variables based on 15 two-digit SIC codes. The point estimates are consistent with an asymmetric relation in each year; however, the p-values on the chi-square test of the symmetry hypothesis are less than ten percent in only two of the eight years. We also estimated a pooled time series, cross-sectional model with year dummy variables for firms within each of the fifteen industry groups. Even with the small sample sizes for many of the industries, in nine of the fifteen industries the coefficients on the pension variables are consistent with an asymmetric relationship. In two of these industries, the difference in coefficients on the underfunded and overfunded pension variable is statistically significant. This evidence suggests that the asymmetric relationship is not due simply to industry differences. 14 Table 2 indicates that the coefficient on leverage is always less than the absolute value of the coefficient on the pension underfunding variable. While we have no theory to suggest why this might occur, taken at face value it suggests that pension debt influences debt ratings more than an equivalent amount of long term debt. One potential explanation is that the leverage variable includes long-term obligations with a lower priority than the pension debt. Investigation of this explanation would require one to classify all of a firm's debt into priority categories and to include separate variables in the model for each category. 15 The problem is that, holding the coefficient and interval estimates (βi's and µi's) fixed, an increase in pension funding can increase or decrease the probability of a particular debt rating even though the coefficient estimate is positive. A positive coefficient implies that an increase in pension funding shifts the density function to the right (the mean increases), but the area under the density function within a fixed interval can either increase or decrease in general.
Rather than use one year's estimates to answer this question, we obtain an "average" of the coefficients for the entire time period by estimating the ordered probit model by pooling the time series data and including year and industry dummy variables. The coefficient estimates on the overfunding and underfunding variables in this model are respectively 3.09 and -9.59. Using these estimated parameters, the hypothetical firm has a predicted debt rating equal to A-and the probability that the firm's debt rating exceeds A-is 0.41. By using its excess assets to eliminate its unfunded liabilities, the firm would increase its probability of a debt rating greater than A-to 0.46. This twelve percent increase in the probability suggests that the estimated asymmetry between unfunded pension liabilities and excess pension assets has economic significance to firms with significantly underfunded and overfunded pension plans.
Further insight about the magnitude of the estimated asymmetry can be obtained by asking: what change in LEVERAGE would result in the same twelve percent change in the predicted probability found above? The answer is that the hypothetical firm would have to decrease its leverage ratio (long term debt divided total assets) from 21.1 percent to about 18.8 percent. In other words, it would have to do an equity-for-debt swap equal to 2.3 percent of its assets, which for the median firm equals $56.3 million. Thus, the model implies that the hypothetical median firm could obtain the same change in the predicted probability of a higher debt rating by (1) using its excess pension assets to eliminate its unfunded pension liabilities, or (2) repurchasing $56.3 million of debt and simultaneously issuing $56.3 million of new equity. As a comparison, McLaughlin et al. (1997) report that the mean seasoned equity issue size for industrial firms over the 1980-1991 period is $53.4 million. This comparison further suggests that the estimated asymmetry has economic significance for firms with significantly underfunded and overfunded pension plans.
SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The evidence presented here indicates that excess pension assets and unfunded pension liabilities influence debt ratings. The evidence therefore supports other studies that find that the payoffs to debt and equity claims are contingent on the pension balance sheet (see Barth 1991; Daley 1984; Dhaliwal 1986; Landsman 1986; and Maher 1987) . The main contribution of the paper, however, is an examination of whether excess pension assets and unfunded pension liabilities influence debt ratings symmetrically. The evidence indicates that unfunded pension liabilities decrease debt ratings more than an equivalent amount of excess pension assets increase debt ratings, all else equal. This asymmetric relationship is consistent with the view that unfunded pension liabilities are corporate liabilities that compete with debt claims, but that there are costs associated with quickly accessing excess pension assets due to the mandated sharing of reverted excess assets.
The evidence of an asymmetry has implications for the financial management of corporate pension plans. If firms cannot quickly access excess pension assets as the evidence suggests, then their incentive to fund plans is reduced. Peskin (1997) provides an analysis of pension fund management taking into account the likely asymmetry in underfunded and overfunded pension plans. The evidence also has implications for accounting policy. In particular, the evidence suggests that SFAS No. 87's requirement that firms separately report the funding status of their overfunded plans and underfunded plans is relevant to debt market participants.
A caveat is that the asymmetry measured here could be due to measurement error (Barth 1991) or omitted correlated variables. An avenue for further research therefore would be to examine the robustness of the results by controlling for other factors and by using other dependent variables that also are likely to be associated with corporate assets and corporate liabilities. 16 Another area for future research is to investigate whether the effects of pension funding on debt ratings are due to a higher probability of insolvency or lower payoffs in the event of insolvency or both. Pursuing this issue would require data on probability of default and pension payoffs in bankruptcy proceedings.
Perhaps the most important issue raised by the results is, why would firms have both underfunded and overfunded plans given the apparent cost in terms of increased cost of debt? The existing literature provides some potential explanations. For example, Ippolito (1985b) argues that underfunded plans provide a bonding mechanism, which reduces the likelihood that unionized labor will act opportunistically and extract rents from owners. Institutional factors could also explain the funding differences. Salary plans are required to be better funded than flat benefit plans (see Ippolito 1989, Chapter. 7) .
17 Empirical evidence on these issues would contribute to our understanding of the funding of defined benefit pension plans and the influence of pension funding on the cost of capital.
